

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 008302  
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DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV:KBROWN:GMH  
APPROVED BY EUR:JGOODBY  
EUR/CE:WWOESSNER (DRAFT)  
EUR/CE:ELAUDERDALE (DRAFT)  
PM/ISP:JHAWES (PHONE)  
L/EUR:JWILLIS (INFO)  
EUR/NE:SWORREL (INFO)  
EUR/WE:JDOBBINS (INFO)  
AF/C:RLKATIS (INFO)  
EUR/SOV:SMCCALL S/S-O:SRPVALERGA  
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O R 120144Z JAN 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
USMISSION USBERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 008302

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS:PGOV, TSPA, UR, GW

SUBJECT:RENEWED SOVIET DEMARCHE ON OTRAG

1. SOVIET CHARGE VASEV CALLED ON DEP ASST SEC (EUR) GOODBY  
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JANUARY 11 (HE HAD REQUESTED TO SEE ASST SEC VEST, WHO WAS UNAVAILABLE) TO HAND OVER NON-PAPER TO USG ON OTRAG, WITH COPY OF NON-PAPER TO FRG WHICH WAS TO BE DELIVERED IN BONN THE SAME DAY. FOLLOWING ARE THE UNOFFICIAL SOVIET TRANSLATIONS OF PAPERS.

2. QUOTE: IN AUGUST 1977 THE SOVIET SIDE INFORMED THE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ABOUT ITS INQUIRY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG CONCERNING THE PURPOSE OF BUILDING BY WEST GERMAN FIRM "OTRAG" A MISSILE TEST RANGE IN ZAIRE AND THE NATURE OF THE WORK GOING ON THERE. AT THE SAME TIME WE DREW ATTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THE NECESSITY TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES, IF REQUIRED, TO PREVENT VIOLATIONS ON THE PART OF THE FRG OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

ALTHOUGH THE US REPRESENTATIVES PROMISED TO STUDY THAT COMMUNICATION OF THE SOVIET SIDE WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED SO FAR ANY REPLY. IF ACTUAL NATURE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FIRM "OTRAG" OR OF THOSE BEHIND IT IS NOT COMPLETELY

CLEAR TO THE AMERICAN SIDE, IT HAS, AS IS KNOWN, AT ITS DISPOSAL APPROPRIATE MEANS OF CONTROL AND VERIFICATION.

THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE WORK AT THE TEST RANGE IN ZAIRE IS IN FULL SWING AND THAT THE PROGRAM OF ONGOING TESTS INCLUDES NEW TYPES OF MISSILES, AMONG THEM THOSE DESIGNED FOR MILITARY USE. THE DENIALS PUBLISHED IN THIS CONNECTION ARE LESS THAN PERSUASIVE. IT IS NO SECRET THAT THE

FRG TAKES INTEREST IN MASTERING PRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE TYPES OF WEAPONS, AMONG THEM CRUISE MISSILES, LARGE TONNAGE SUBMARINES, CAPABLE OF CARRYING MISSILES AND SO  
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ON. THIS, OF COURSE, IS AS WELL KNOWN TO THE AMERICAN SIDE AS TO US. IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF CONCERN THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG HAS GIVEN NO OFFICIAL REPLY TO OUR INQUIRY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE UNDERTAKE A NEW DEMARCHE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG.

WE TAKE IT THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL TREAT THE SAID QUESTION WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE AND TRANQUILITY IN EUROPE WHICH IS SHARED BY OUR STATES IN CONFORMITY WITH THE KNOWN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE WAR AND POST-WAR TIME. THERE ARE INFLUENTIAL CIRCLES IN THE FRG WHICH SEEK A WAY TO GET MILITARILY EQUAL WITH LEADING MILITARY POWERS, TO REVISE THE EXISTING RESTRICTIONS FOR THE FRG IN MILITARY SPHERE. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT COULD ONLY HAVE THE MOST ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

SPEAKING ABOUT THAT WE ARE GUIDED NOT ONLY BY OUR INTERESTS OR BY THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES. WE ARE CAPABLE TO SAFEGUARD THEM. NOR DO WE HAVE ANY FEELING OF ANIMOSITY TOWARDS THE FRG, OR A DESIRE TO CAST A SHADOW ON THE POLITICAL COURSE OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. BUT IT

IS KNOWN FROM THE GERMAN HISTORY THAT EVERY TIME THE COUNTRY HAD TAKEN THE PATH OF MILITARIZATION IT ALWAYS LED TO ONE AND THE SAME RESULT. ON THIS ACCOUNT WE ALL HAVE THE SAME EXPERIENCE AND, WE TRUST, NONE OF US WANTS ANY REPETITION OF IT. HENCE, THERE ARISES THE NEED TO TIMELY UNDERTAKE STEPS TO PREVENT THE DEPARTURE BY THE FRG FROM THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED UPON IT IN THE MILITARY SPHERE OR THEIR REVISION. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS SERVES COMMON INTEREST, THE INTERESTS OF PEACE, SECURITY AND NORMAL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. WE HOPE THAT THE US SIDE ADHERES TO THE SAME APPROACH AND WILL ACT ACCORDINGLY, THE QUESTION OF THE WEST GERMAN MISSILE TEST GROUND IN ZAIRE INCLUDED. UNQUOTE.

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3. TRANSLATION OF SOVIET NOTE TO FRG READS: QUOTE

IN AUGUST 1977, THE SOVIET SIDE MADE AN INQUIRY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG WITH REGARD TO THE PURPOSES OF THE BUILDING BY A WEST GERMAN FIRM "OTRAG" OF A MISSILE TEST RANGE IN ZAIRE AND TO THE NATURE OF THE WORK WHICH IS UNDERWAY THERE. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THAT INQUIRY.

MEANWHILE, THERE ARE CONTINUED REPORTS THAT THE WORK AT TEST RANGE IN ZAIRE IS IN FULL SWING AND THAT THE PROGRAM OF ONGOING TESTS INCLUDES NEW TYPES OF MISSILES, AMONG THEM THOSE DESIGNED FOR MILITARY USE. THE DENIALS PUBLISHED IN THIS CONNECTION ARE LESS THAN PERSUASIVE AND CANNOT ELIMINATE UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN.

PROCEEDING FROM ITS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER KNOWN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE WAR AND POST-WAR PERIOD, THE SOVIET SIDE RENEWS ITS INQUIRY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF FRG REGARDING THE PURPOSES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MISSILE TEST RANGE IN ZAIRE AND OF THE NATURE OF WORK THERE. IT ALSO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER THE ACTIVITIES OF THE "OTRAG" FIRM ARE UNDER CONTROL OF THE FRG AUTHORITIES AND WHETHER APPROPRIATE MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THOSE AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT WEST GERMAN FIRMS FROM DEVELOPING AND TESTING OFFENSIVE TYPES OF MISSILE WEAPONS. THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO RECEIVING SUCH INFORMATION. IN DETERMINING ITS FURTHER STEPS IN THIS QUESTION IT WOULD LIKE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ASPECTS OF THIS MATTER INCLUDING THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRG. UNQUOTE.

4. GOODBY RESPONDED BY ASSURING VASEV THAT AMBASSADOR  
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DOBRYNIN'S AUG.22 NON-PAPER HAS BEEN CAREFULLY REVIEWED AND THAT WE HAD HOPED TO REPLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, ALTHOUGH THE ADDITIONAL POINTS RAISED BY VASEV MAY REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. GOODBY THEN MADE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

A) THE SOVIET POSITION ON FRG INTENTIONS IS NOT CON-

SISTENT WITH THE USG'S UNDERSTANDING OF FRG POLICIES;

B) WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN EXCHANGE IN SEPTEMBER BETWEEN FRG AND SOVIET OFFICIALS ON THE SOVIET DEMARCHE. WHAT DID SOVIETS MEAN BY SAYING THERE HAD BEEN NO "OFFICIAL" RESPONSE? WAS THE REPLY AT THE WRONG LEVEL OR DID IT NOT TAKE PLACE?

C) OUR RECOLLECTION IS THAT THE MAJORITY OF PRESS ALLEGATIONS ON MILITARY MISSILE TESTING AT OTRAG APPEARED IN AUGUST. COULD VASEV BE MORE SPECIFIC ON RECENT PRESS ALLEGATIONS.

D) VASEV'S RENEWED EXPRESSION OF CONCERN WILL BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY AND OTHER OFFICIALS.

5. VASEV REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON POINTS B AND C, BUT WOULD CHECK AND ATTEMPT TO CONTACT GOODBY BY PHONE. HE ALSO GAVE STANDARD SOVIET LINE RE POINT A THAT SOVIET EXPERIENCES WITH GERMANS IN PAST WERE "UNFORTUNATE" (TO WHICH GOODBY POINTED OUT ERROR OF COMPARING GERMANY OF '20'S AND '30'S WITH FRG TODAY). VASEV ALSO SPECULATED "UNOFFICIALLY" THAT FRG "LENIENCY" IN TRANSFERING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH HEIGHTENED SOVIET CONCERN, TO WHICH GOODBY POINTED OUT THAT, WHILE ALL ARE AWARE OF THE US POSITION ON THAT ISSUE, THE FRG HAS IMPOSED VERY STRONG SAFEGUARDS.

6. GOODBY CLOSED CONVERSATION BY ASKING HOW THIS LATEST  
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DEMARCHE MIGHT AFFECT THE BILATERAL FRG-USSR ATMOSPHERE. IS THE TENOR OF THE SOVIET APPROACH VIEWED AS PRODUCTIVE? VASEV ASSERTED THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE "QUITE SAFE" AND MATURE AND WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS EXCHANGE.

7. WE ASSUME SOVIETS HAVE MADE SAME APPROACH IN LONDON

AND PARIS.

--- WE BELIEVE THE ISSUE SHOULD NOT  
BE ALLOWED TO FOUNDER AND THAT THE BONN GROUP SHOULD  
RAPIDLY DEVELOP STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH RENEWED SOVIET  
DEMARCHE. CHRISTOPHER

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